

# Approved For Release 2000/08/22: CIA-RDP78S05452A000100070001-9

18 April 1969

TECHNICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

FOR NON-TELECOMMUNICATIONS

EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

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# TECHNICAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR NON-TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

#### AND SYSTEMS

#### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to assess the degree of emanations vulnerability present in non-communications processing equipment and to estimate the resources to be allocated to a continuing protective program against this hazard.

#### II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- 1. Information processing equipments using electric or electro-mechanical power inadvertently emit discrete signals that may contain the information being processed.
- 2. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for the protection of intelligence information by the National Security Act of 1947.
- 3. The National Security Council by the National Security Directive on Communications Security has assigned individual agencies responsibility for radiation security programs by non-communications equipment.
- 4. The Office of Communications has an active, continuing protective program against this type of threat to communications equipment. Responsibilities for a similar protective program for information processing equipment other than communications were formally assigned to the Office of Communications by effective 4 April 1969.

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- 5. The Office of Communications has undertaken a limited testing program of specific non-communications information processing equipment. Resources for the equipment of this program were diverted from the COMSEC program.
- 6. In anticipation of the assignment, OC received additional slots. No funds were provided for this task.

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7. Approximately 60 computer systems with over 1,000 ancillary devices and approximately 10,000 office machine equipments are in use by this Agency.

# III. ASSUMPTIONS

- 1. The technical security threat posed by the opposition will not diminish and may increase.
- 2. The Agency's inventory of equipment used to process classified information will increase, both in total numbers and in different types.
- 3. No dramatic solve-all solution will be developed.

## IV. DISCUSSION

- l. If we are to maintain the standard of protection required for communications equipment, this security program must be continued without abatement. New equipments will be added to the inventory and will place an added strain on the program. Therefore, funds and personnel cannot be diverted from this effort.
- 2. Sufficient tests of non-communications equipment have been completed by other agencies to indicate vulnerabilities. Such tests are not directly related to this Agency unless the equipment and installation are identical to that tested. Even if tests were applicable, there is no program to implement protective measures economically and on the basis of need. To define the vulnerabilities of Agency equipment and to implement the necessary protective measures in a manageable manner, a phased security program is needed. The proposed funding and manpower requirements for a phased effort are described in the attachments "Explanation of Personnel Increases for the New EMSEC Program" and "EMSEC/COMSEC Program".

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#### V. CONCLUSION

To provide the necessary protection of non-communications equipment, CIA must undertake an appropriate security program. This task has been assigned to the Office of Communications. Assets cannot be diverted from other Office of Communications sources. Therefore, the Office of Communications is faced with a task that is unfunded and undermanned.

#### VI. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the phased funding and manpower proposals specified in Attachments A and B be approved.